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Leaves of Grassroots PoLitics:  
Whitman, carLyLe, and the  
imaGination of Democratic Vistas
Scott Henkel
“Democracy,” Walt WHitman writes, “is a word the real gist of which 
still sleeps, quite unawaken’d, notwithstanding the resonance and the 
many angry tempests out of which its syllables have come, from pen or 
tongue. it is a great word, whose history, i suppose, remains unwrit-
ten, because that history has yet to be enacted.”1 this claim appears in 
Whitman’s 1871 essay Democratic Vistas, and as the metaphor of the title 
makes clear, Whitman uses his text to look ahead, to imagine an idea of 
democracy to come. Whitman signals to us that such work is historical 
in nature: theorizing possible futures necessitates an understanding of 
our past. as manning marable writes, “[h]istorical amnesia blocks the 
construction of potentially successful social movements. . . . thus, for 
the oppressed, the act of reconstructing history is inextricably linked 
to the political practices, or praxis, of transforming the present and fu-
ture.”2 few texts are more important than Democratic Vistas in debates 
about literary history’s value for prefiguring possible democratic futures, 
but how are we to use our literary history for contemporary politics? 
roberto mangabeira Unger and cornel West call Democratic Vistas 
“the secular bible of democracy”3 and stephen John mack has recently 
called the text Whitman’s “most profound and sustained meditation on 
democratic life.”4 Like Unger, West, and mack, i believe that Democratic 
Vistas is still capable of helping us address our contemporary political 
problems. Whitman wrote his text, in part, as a rebuttal to thomas 
carlyle’s essay “shooting niagara: and after?”5 Whitman directly 
responds to carlyle’s criticism of democracy, naming him at several 
moments in the text, and, in doing so, Whitman positions carlyle as the 
counterpoint to his own position. carlyle’s essay is shockingly bigoted, 
and this fact may have caused scholars to reject his ideas largely without 
scrutiny. carlyle’s ideas are offensive, but they are not locked safely in 
the past. Quite the contrary, the ideas that animated both carlyle and 
Whitman still inform contemporary debates about democracy. much 
of the scholarship on Democratic Vistas has given the conversation 
between carlyle and Whitman only a brief treatment and has, there-
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fore, not sufficiently unpacked what Whitman thought was the task of 
“advanced students” and people “of any brains”: to argue for “a wider 
democratizing of institutions” and to think about “how, and in what 
degree and part, most prudently to democratize” (PW, 2:382-383). 
this debate largely focuses on two competing values—authority and 
autonomy—and the degree to which these values undercut or undergird 
our ideas about democracy. as i will show, the dynamics of the debate 
between carlyle and Whitman can be instructive for those of us who 
believe that the intersection of literary study and the study of political 
movements is vital to a thriving democratic culture.
But how we use this history is a matter of crucial concern. in the 
Pragmatic Whitman: reimagining american Democracy, mack suggests 
that Whitman’s ideas are usefully viewed though the pragmatist’s lens. 
after demonstrating the ways that Whitman’s thinking fits the pragmatic 
tradition, he seeks to “explore Whitman’s mature vision in Democratic 
Vistas and conclude with some observations on its moral and political 
implications for contemporary america” (xix). mack seeks, in other 
words, to look through Whitman’s eyes and to speculate about what 
he might have said about contemporary politics if he were transported 
from the nineteenth century into the twenty-first. mack pays careful 
attention to the historical circumstances in which Whitman’s ideas were 
formed, and this is to his credit. But the lessons of Democratic Vistas have 
little to teach us if we hope to impose Whitman’s vision upon ourselves. 
instead, we ought to stand upon Whitman’s shoulders and take stock 
of what we can see from that new vantage point. 
to a significant degree, our contemporary debates about democ-
ratization continue to revolve around the problems of authority and 
autonomy, as they did for carlyle and Whitman. although they arrive 
at different conclusions, carlyle and Whitman agree that the degree to 
which common people—whom carlyle calls “the swarm” (“sn,” 4) and 
Whitman calls “the unnamed, unknown rank and file” (PW, 2:377)—
have the capacity for autonomy is the same degree to which democracy 
is viable. carlyle lamented the fact that the political movements of his 
day were “cutting asunder [the] straps and ties . . . of old regulations, 
fetters, and restrictions” because he sees no capacity for autonomy in 
the swarm (“sn,” 9). instead, he hopes for an enlightened leadership 
class to govern us and to direct our affairs—the class of people whom 
he calls “heroes” in “shooting niagara” (“sn,” 33-34) and, more fully, 
in his book on Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History.6 Whit-
man writes that the “purpose of democracy” is to cultivate the “highest 
freedom” so that “the unnamed, unknown rank and file” can “become 
a law, and a series of laws, unto” themselves (PW, 2:374-375). addi-
tionally, Whitman knows that autonomy in a democracy is not about 
atomistic individuals, but rather it is always a negotiation between “a 
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large variety of character” and “full play for human nature to expand 
itself in numberless and even conflicting directions” (PW, 2:362), or, 
in other words, the problem of continually expanding our ideas and 
practices of freedom while simultaneously living peacefully with others. 
in the debate between carlyle and Whitman in the pages of “shoot-
ing niagara” and Democratic Vistas, we can find no less than a broad 
conversation about the theoretical scaffolding, and therefore the viabil-
ity, of democracy itself. While i am reminded of what Kenneth m. Price 
calls Whitman’s “signature expression”—“Be radical—be radical—be 
not too damned radical!”7—i will argue that we can find in Democratic 
Vistas the seeds of a political project that i will call grassroots politics: 
Whitman’s proposal for the democratization of “all public and private 
life” (PW, 2:389). this argument differs from that which we find in 
the Pragmatic Whitman in two key ways: first, i see far more radical 
ideas and potential in Democratic Vistas, and second, the technique that 
i will use will situate Whitman in his historical moment and indicate 
the debate’s implications for contemporary politics. Whitman believed 
that america in the nineteenth century needed a new conception of 
democracy to differentiate it from carlyle’s “old order”; likewise, we 
need a twenty-first-century interpretation of democracy. the debate 
between carlyle and Whitman provides an opportunity to frame just 
such a project.
my goals for this essay are to explicate the debate between car-
lyle and Whitman to a greater degree than has yet been attempted in 
the scholarship, and to refocus this debate in a way that i believe will 
be a valuable contribution to grassroots political movements. When i 
use the phrase grassroots politics, i do not define it as a synonym for 
populism, as it is normally used in popular and scholarly texts. i use 
it in the more radical sense that comes from my reading of Democratic 
Vistas: radicalism and grassroots politics suggest getting to the roots—a 
more direct democracy, one that is less mediated through representa-
tives like carlyle’s heroes, and is, therefore, more meaningful to more 
people. this interpretation stems from the emphasis Whitman places on 
the autonomy of “the unknown, unnamed rank and file” (PW, 2:377), 
who, in Whitman’s mind and my own, ought to see democracy as a way 
to “become a law, and series of laws” unto themselves (PW, 2:375). i 
also couple my understanding of grassroots politics with Whitman’s 
emphasis on the negotiation between expanding our ideas and practices 
of freedom while living peacefully with others. this implies a focus on 
democratic political movements—swarmery in the best sense—that 
provide ways for the demos, people, to become a kratos, force. to ac-
complish the essay’s goals, i will first comment on the aspects of the 
Pragmatic Whitman that need to be called into question. next, i will 
reframe the debate between carlyle and Whitman, and finally, i will 
104
recast the debate in ways that will help us to look a bit further into the 
democratic vistas.
Whitman’s “imposition”
 as his title suggests, mack attempts to marshal Whitman into the 
pragmatic tradition, writing that “[o]ne of [his] intentions in this study 
is to demonstrate, more thoroughly than other authors have previously 
tried, how Whitman participates in [the pragmatic] tradition and how 
the insights of other pragmatist thinkers can help to produce worth-
while readings of his poetry and, by extension, his democratic poetics” 
(xix). mack wants to claim Whitman for the pragmatic tradition, and 
he finds copious evidence. 
other writers have made similar moves. michel fabre points out 
that emma Goldman and eugene debs, for example, admired Demo-
cratic Vistas and Leaves of Grass and, to varying degrees, appropriated 
Whitman’s ideas for their projects.8 in our historical moment, the meta-
phor of Whitman’s essay has been appropriated by writers like George 
Will to put a bright façade on the atrocity of the current iraq occupa-
tion.9 there is enough ambiguity in Whitman’s writings to produce 
these divergent readings; therefore, i do not fault mack for using the 
pragmatist’s lens. i simply believe that Democratic Vistas, and, as marable 
suggests, the political movements that could see it as part of a usable 
past, are better served by reading the text through a more radical lens.
my first objection to mack’s argument is that writers in the 
pragmatist tradition often place an undue emphasis on the problem 
of identifying and training the class of people who would make the 
best leaders—the problem, in other words, of a political vanguard. in 
this vein, cornel West writes in the american evasion of Philosophy: 
a Genealogy of Pragmatism that the “pragmatists’ preoccupation with 
power, provocation, and personality—in contrast, say, to grounding 
knowledge, regulating instruction, and promoting tradition—signifies 
an intellectual calling to administer to a confused populace caught in 
the whirlwinds of societal crisis, the cross fires of ideological polemics, 
and the storms of class, racial, and gender conflicts.”10 But the prag-
matic tradition also includes another view. Writing about a decade later, 
West tempers his position: in the paragraph in which he and Unger call 
Democratic Vistas the “secular bible of democracy,” they write that the 
“fundamental strand in the american religion of possibility” is a “faith 
in the genius of ordinary men and women. . . . the capacity for strong 
and original experience, rather than being confined to a small number 
of geniuses, heroes, and eccentrics, should become widespread among 
ordinary people” (West & Unger, 11). 
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While mack writes that “Whitman had always understood that 
democracy could only be justified by a faith that every human being 
possessed a natural capacity for self-governance” (137), the Pragmatic 
Whitman places a greater emphasis on the role of visionary leadership. 
to orient his reading of Democratic Vistas, mack quotes erik erikson’s 
childhood and society: “political, economic, and technical elites, when-
ever they have accepted the obligation to perfect a new style of living 
at a logical point in history, have provided men with a high sense of 
identity and have inspired them to reach new levels of civilization” 
(133). mack writes that Whitman’s remedy to political problems does 
not call for a “bureaucracy of experts” (151) to administer for the rest 
of us, but the question is not about a bureaucracy. mack’s argument is 
founded on the problem of living up to the ideas that visionary leaders 
provide for us. this is not to say that autonomy is unimportant to the 
pragmatists, but rather to say that, in the pragmatist tradition, one has 
a choice to place an emphasis on cornel West’s earlier comments about 
“administer[ing] to a confused populace” or on West and Unger’s later 
comments about “faith in the genius of ordinary men and women.” 
mack chooses the former. 
it is this assumption about fidelity to inspired visionaries that 
leads mack to use Whitman in the ways he does—as someone who 
presents an “imposition” to be obeyed. accordingly, mack argues that 
the “importance of Whitman’s democracy . . . is to be found in the 
moral quality of whatever demands it makes upon those who take its 
principles to heart. . . .  to understand the moral and political demands 
that Whitman’s vision entails we need to look to the forces that shaped 
its growth” (xxi). Understanding the context out of which Whitman’s 
political ideas developed is a valuable scholarly activity. however, to 
take those ideas, shaped as they were by the politics of the nineteenth 
century, and to apply them to the politics of the twenty-first century is a 
mistake. Political challenges may retain their broad themes in different 
historical moments; important values like authority and autonomy may, 
at first glance, seem universal because concerns about them endure. But 
to suggest that these problems are exactly the same, or to suggest that 
political praxis could transcend history is, in Whitman’s own words, to 
use Democratic Vistas as “fossil theology” (PW, 2:409).
in the last two sentences of the Pragmatic Whitman, mack writes 
that Whitman’s “challenge to us is to identify—and reconcile—the real, 
historically specific content of these competing definitions of liberty. 
to accept that challenge is to continuously restructure the terms of as-
sociative life in ways that secure ever-newer forms of freedom” (165). 
however, this historical specificity is not used in mack’s technique 
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for commenting on contemporary politics. instead, mack urges us 
to think with Whitman’s mind, to follow his vision and to accept the 
consequences that such a vision imposes upon us. 
mack writes that “Democratic Vistas is a blueprint for a kind of 
literary criticism designed to promote social change” (142). to follow 
this blueprint, mack helps us to see what he calls “Whitman’s vision”:
the idea of individual freedom did not die as a political ideal, supplanted by notions 
of the regulated state. to be sure, both live on as the great antinomies of the american 
democratic tradition. the particular virtue of Whitman’s vision is that it strives to 
bring these philosophical antagonists into relation.… as Whitman sees it, all public 
debate in a democratic society is necessarily structured by the opposing ideals of 
liberty and governance. (xxii)
mack concludes his book by interpreting the “particular virtue of 
Whitman’s vision” and using that interpretation to comment on cur-
rent issues in american politics. this move is a version of presentism in 
reverse: rather than viewing the nineteenth century through the eyes of 
the twenty-first, as some people mistakenly do, mack makes the equal 
and opposite mistake when he interprets what he believes Whitman’s 
vision to be and “conclude[s] with some observations on its moral and 
political implications for contemporary america” (xix). mack’s strategy 
is to import Whitman’s ideas, altered by interpretation, but not histori-
cal specificity, into the present. 
“to understand the scope of the demands that Whitman’s vision im-
poses on us,” mack writes, “we should begin by recalling that democracy, 
for Whitman, is more than the political process” (160, emphasis mine). 
the last part of mack’s comment is correct: Whitman does clearly argue 
that democracy is not just “for elections, for politics, and for a party 
name” (PW, 2:389). the first part of mack’s assertion is problematic, 
however: why must “Whitman’s vision” be “impos[ed]” upon us? While 
we may have a debt to pay to Whitman, this debt does not mean that 
we ought to think with his mind—to do so would take away our right to 
make political decisions based on our own circumstances, and it would 
be to accept the limitations of Whitman’s vision as well. my criticism, 
simply expressed, is that Whitman’s own politics are historically situ-
ated, as are ours. While the problems Whitman faced are antecedents 
to our own, and therefore similar in many ways, it would be a mistake 
to assume that the lessons we take from Democratic Vistas need not be 
situated in our own historical moment if we hope to apply those lessons 
to our contemporary political situation. the argument is not whether 
our literary history has something to offer contemporary politics—it 
certainly does—but rather about the best way to use this history. 
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on this point, robert Leigh davis is exactly correct: “Democratic 
Vistas begins with a view of authors as legislating gods hardwiring 
the political unconscious of the nation. it ends with a view of readers 
challenging those gods, wrestling with them, and in that democratic 
gymnasium finding the true measure of their strength.”11 We find no 
such challenge to the gods in the Pragmatic Whitman, and this becomes 
apparent when mack begins to apply Whitman’s vision to specific areas 
of contemporary public policy: 
Whitman’s organic democracy does . . . place complex demands on the ways we 
attempt to fashion a meaningful associative life. to cite just one example, consider 
its implications for the way we approach the problem of economic privation and the 
distribution of wealth. . . .  Paternalistic and dehumanizing policies such as welfare 
are, however nobly intentioned, almost as odious as official indifference. Just as it 
would be absurd for a society to offer the ballot as a substitute for food, so, too, would 
it be unthinkable to design a policy that assists the poor by crippling their capacity 
for engaged democratic living—by dismantling the psychological equipment a citizen 
needs for self-government while simultaneously undermining the high value democratic 
culture places on self-reliance. (163-164)
Because welfare programs are beyond Whitman’s nineteenth-century 
vision, they ought to be beyond ours as well, mack argues. even though 
mack refers at one point to “the shackles of a laissez-faire democratic 
theory” (99), the comments about the distribution of wealth leads one 
to believe that mack advocates a return to the laissez-faire policies of the 
nineteenth century. the main characteristics of this interpretation seem 
to be the importance of bootstrap-style self-reliance and the absence 
of “paternalistic and dehumanizing policies such as welfare” (164). to 
accept Whitman’s vision, it seems, is to tear holes in the social safety 
net. if we were to choose to do so, we could point out that mack fails 
to see the value that Whitman placed on equality (PW, 2:396) and the 
“great word solidarity” (PW, 2:382), which would mitigate the claims 
that mack makes. But these speculations are answers to the wrong 
questions. rather than imposing Whitman’s ideas upon the present, 
we might use Democratic Vistas as a touchstone to reformulate the ques-
tions of democratization for our historical moment and then see what 
our answers might provoke.
the reasons for not wanting to impose Whitman’s vision upon our 
historical moment could not be clearer. ed folsom and others have 
shown conclusively that while Whitman had many admirable political 
ideas, even the most advanced would seem regressive to us.12 a sym-
pathetic reader may look at Whitman’s nascent multiculturalism and 
praise him for the parts of his thinking that were, at many moments, 
more advanced than his peers. in our time, however, Whitman’s stances 
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on racial equality, gender equality, and class equality are clearly regres-
sive. Whitman’s tepid response to the racism of “shooting niagara,” 
for example, lays bare the fact that Whitman is not willing to respond 
to carlyle on this point in fully-throated ways. for carlyle, questions 
of citizenship and equality along racial lines were merely frivolous. as 
folsom notes, Whitman does not adequately challenge carlyle’s rac-
ism because, for “Whitman, as for many white americans in the civil 
War era, it was possible to be opposed to slavery but also to be against 
equal rights for african americans” (46). Who among us, except for 
rabid fringe, would take such a position today? When Whitman displays 
nascent multicultural or feminist leanings, for example, they are im-
pressive precisely because of his position in the nineteenth century—a 
moment when aspects of his vision were well beyond many of his peers. 
today, his vision would be viewed as an anachronism. 
furthermore, so many elements of our politics are beyond Whit-
man’s vision. to take just one example, Whitman could not imagine a 
scenario where corporate power rivals or exceeds government power, 
as it does today. the roots of this problem are found in the nineteenth 
century: it was the supreme court’s santa clara decision in 1886 that 
codified the idea that corporations have the same rights as people.13 
Whitman saw that the legacy of reconstruction was being bastardized 
for all sorts of nefarious purposes, as in santa clara. But to expect Whit-
man’s nineteenth-century vision of capitalism to be able to explain the 
corporate threats to democracy today is to stretch an historical analysis 
of Whitman’s own vision beyond the breaking point.14 the degree to 
which Democratic Vistas is valuable for grassroots politics is the same 
degree to which we are able to cease using Whitman’s vision as a blue-
print to be imposed and begin to use his ideas as historical touchstones.
rather than reading Whitman in the hope of discovering what he 
might think about our contemporary politics, the alternative is to expli-
cate the texts in ways that are historically situated in both Whitman’s 
moment and our own. i would argue that this method holds truer to the 
ideals that Whitman himself expressed: to honor Whitman’s style is to 
learn “under it to destroy the teacher,” to take Whitman’s ideas and to 
advance them in ways that are beyond his own historical vision.15 the 
problems Whitman faced are historical antecedents to our own, but we 
need to ask new questions and also therefore arrive at different answers 
to what Whitman calls “the great question of democracy” (PW, 2:363). 
on this point, we can take clues from david scott’s work in con-
scripts of modernity: the tragedy of colonial enlightenment. scott writes 
that his “most general concern . . . is with the conceptual problem 
of political presents and with how reconstructed pasts and anticipated 
futures are thought out in relation to them.”16 in many ways, scott’s 
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method is reminiscent of Whitman’s own orientation in Democratic 
Vistas—certainly the task of prefiguring the future requires an under-
standing of our past. But scott introduces an idea that diverges from 
Whitman as well. he writes that his aim is 
to make out a case for a practice of criticism that is alert to the idea that propositions 
are always answers to questions or interventions in a discursive context, because it 
seems to me that keeping this idea in view is one way of helping us to determine whether 
the questions we have been asking the past to answer continue to be questions worth 
having answers to, and whether the stories we have been telling ourselves about the 
past’s relation to the present continue to be stories worth telling. (209) 
in scott’s method, political movements are always best understood as 
historical in nature, but the problem he sees is that it is insufficient to 
continue to ask the same questions that previous thinkers did, only to 
arrive at new answers. scott argues that the best way to approach the 
history of these movements, and to construct possible futures from that 
history, is also to ask new questions about the movement’s history and 
possible futures, and also, therefore, to arrive at new answers to those 
questions. in this vein, we can revisit the debate between carlyle and 
Whitman, and reassess not only the answers that Whitman gives to 
political problems, but also the questions that he asks. 
shooing the swarm
Whitman was fairly frequently concerned with carlyle’s writing, 
and as davis points out, he owed carlyle both an intellectual and an 
artistic debt (541). Whitman wrote in his Brooklyn Daily eagle review 
of on Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History that carlyle is a 
“democrat” in an “enlarged sense,” meaning that “he is quick to cham-
pion the downtrodden, and earnest in his wrath at tyranny.”17 But by the 
time specimen Days was published, Whitman’s views on carlyle were 
much different. in the essay “carlyle from american Points of view,” 
for example, Whitman writes that “carlyle’s grim fate was cast to live 
and dwell in, and largely embody, the parturition agony and qualms 
of the old order, amid crowded accumulations of ghastly morbidity, 
giving birth to the new” (PW, 1:254). Whitman recognized in carlyle 
something quite useful: a voice for this “old order,” an order against 
which Whitman could imagine a more democratic future. 
according to thomas f. haddox, “[a]lthough specifically a re-
sponse to [Benjamin] disraeli’s reform Bill, which was about to en-
franchise much of the working class in Britain, ‘shooting niagara’ is 
more generally a condemnation of democratic government as such.”18 
haddox is correct, but although carlyle was critical of democracy, to 
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be sure, his greater interest—and object of greater scorn—was what he 
called “the swarm”: those people and political movements who were 
“cutting asunder [the] straps and ties . . . of old regulations, fetters, 
and restrictions” (“sn,” 9). in carlyle’s mind, further democratiza-
tion would not be wise: he argued that once allowed to rule itself, a 
task he sarcastically called “improvement,” the “swarm” was “likely to 
be ‘improved off the face of the earth’ in a generation or two” (“sn,” 
7-8). for carlyle, to take the “niagara leap of completed democracy” 
is to tempt fate in foolish ways (“sn,” 3). too much, too soon, for too 
many, carlyle believes, is like the niagara plunge: one chooses to take 
it, but it rarely has good results.
Whitman addresses this critique directly, and although he admits 
that his “mood” had been much like carlyle’s (PW, 2:375), it is “[t]o 
him or her within whose thought rages the battle, advancing, retreating, 
between democracy’s convictions, aspirations, and the people’s crude-
ness, vice, caprices, i mainly write this essay” (PW, 2:363). Whitman 
writes that
anything worthy to be call’d statesmanship in the old World, i should say, among the 
advanced students, adepts, or men of any brains, does not debate to-day whether to 
hold on, attempting to lean back and monarchize, or to look forward and democratize—
but how, and in what degree and part, most prudently to democratize. (PW, 2:383)
the friction between carlyle and Whitman is about the meaning and 
scope of democracy: carlyle’s interpretation favors less democracy—
much less; Whitman’s favors more democracy—much more. carlyle 
sees himself as grasping, trying to conserve an “old order” which he 
believes to be good and deserving; Whitman believes that such activ-
ity is an attempt to “lean back,” a regression, an unwillingness to look 
into the democratic vistas. Whereas carlyle mocks the idea that the 
democratic franchise should be extended to the “swarm,” Whitman 
argues for “democracy in all public and private life, and in the army 
and the navy” (PW, 2:389). 
specifically, the friction between the authority of a leadership 
class and the autonomy of “the unnamed, unknown, rank and file” 
is important to carlyle and Whitman because they reason that the 
metric used to determine if the people could rule in a democracy is the 
degree to which common people can rule themselves. much depends 
on this facet of the debate: if one believes in what c. L. r. James calls 
“the creative power of freedom and the capacity of the ordinary man 
to govern” (par. 43), as Whitman does, then democracy itself rests on 
a sure foundation.19 the question for carlyle was how to identify and 
train his class of heroes, and how to train the swarm to obey the heroes’ 
vision. the question for Whitman was “how, and in what degree and 
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part, most prudently” to prepare “the unnamed, unknown, rank and 
file” for democracy in “all public and private life”? 
“shooting niagara . . . and after?” appeared anonymously in 
macmillan’s magazine in april 1867, and was edited and expanded 
soon thereafter into a pamphlet.20 as James anthony froude writes, 
“shooting niagara” 
was carlyle’s last public utterance on english politics. he thought but little of it, and 
was aware how useless it would prove. in [carlyle’s] Journal, august 3 [1867], he 
says:— “an article for masson and macmillan’s magazine took up a good deal of time. 
it came out mostly from accident, little by volition, and is very fierce, exaggerative, 
ragged, unkempt, and defective. nevertheless i am secretly rather glad than otherwise 
that it is out, that the howling doggeries (dead ditto and other) should have my last 
word on their affairs and them, since it was to be had.”21
carlyle knew that his “last word” would be met with strong resistance. 
the appeal for electoral reform at the time was widespread, with sup-
port from the reform League and reform Union, as well as the Brit-
ish labor movement. subsequently, the British parliament passed the 
reform act of 1867, known as the second reform act, mostly in an 
effort to appease the demands of the political movements. the second 
reform act was intended to enfranchise sober, skilled men, and it had 
the effect of enfranchising much of the male working class.22 
the argument of carlyle’s essay is rather straightforward: carlyle 
mocks these efforts because he believes that the “swarm” does not have 
the capacity for autonomy that democracy requires. the “and after?” 
of his title speaks volumes: if the democratic franchise were to be ex-
panded too widely, carlyle argues, the nation as a whole would suffer. 
he begins his argument by resisting what was coming to be a foregone 
conclusion. carlyle was waiting for
democracy to complete itself; to go the full length of its course, towards the Bottomless 
or into it, no power now extant to prevent it or even considerably retard it,—till we have 
seen where it will lead us to, and whether there will then be any return possible, or none. 
complete “liberty” to all persons; count of heads to be the divine court of appeal 
on every question and interest of mankind; count of heads to choose a Parliament 
according to its own heart at last, and sit with Penny newspapers zealously watching 
the same; said Parliament, so chosen and so watched, to do what trifle of legislating 
and administering may still be needed in such an england, with its hundred and fifty 
millions “free” more and more to follow each his own nose, by way of guide-post in 
this intricate world. (“sn,” 1-2)
Why underscore “liberty” as carlyle does? Why would carlyle be so 
vocal in his skepticism of the “Penny newspapers,” those popular forces 
of commentary which would “watch” the Parliament? carlyle evokes 
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the anxiety of one who is about to be scrutinized in a certain way: by 
those members of the “swarm,” those whom carlyle feels are beneath 
this Parliament. Liberty to all persons, voting on issues, scrutiny of of-
ficials—these are democracy’s faults in carlyle’s eyes. What carlyle is 
describing are real threats to the political order: he sees an uncontrollable 
swarm jeopardizing the institutions of government and civil society. 
carlyle correctly sees that these political movements may refigure the 
calculus of political power, and he reacts to conserve the order that he 
believes to be worth protecting. 
in one of many interesting rhetorical constructions, carlyle 
writes that “count of heads [will] be the divine court of appeal on 
every question and interest of mankind; count of heads to choose a 
Parliament according to its own heart at last” (“sn,” 1). Whereas a 
construction such as “the counting of heads . . . ” would simply imply 
majoritarian rule, by writing “count of heads,” capitalized and acting 
as the noun in his sentence, carlyle is able to personify the electoral 
franchise with an aristocratic title. this particular personification il-
lustrates carlyle’s conservative impulse: even the object of his critique 
is rendered in the language of the “old order.”
a more ideal republic, carlyle argues, would be hierarchically 
organized. Governing would be the sole purview of the educated and 
expert, who presumably have the most skill at the task, and who need 
not be “interfered with”:
supposing the commonwealth established, and democracy rampant, as in america, 
or in france by fits for 70 odd years past,—it is a favourable fact that our aristocracy, 
in their essential height of position, and capability (or possibility) of doing good, are 
not at once likely to be interfered with; that they will be continued farther on their 
trial, and only the question somewhat more stringently put to them, “What are you 
good for, then? show us, show us, or else disappear!” (“sn,” 17)
carlyle writes to defend hierarchical institutions like the “aristoc-
racy,” which, in their “essential height of position,” are jeopardized 
by democratization. once democratization begins, the logic goes, one 
day the traditions that carlyle holds dear will eventually come under 
such scrutiny that they will be forced to justify their existence or “else 
disappear!” carlyle believes that the members of this “aristocracy” are 
benevolent leaders, and he rightly notices that they are threatened by 
“rampant” democracy. 
in carlyle’s mind, he is making an ethical argument, because he 
believes that people who lack the autonomy required for democracy 
must be governed by others. furthermore, carlyle argues that those 
who have the most skill at governing should govern, and those who 
do not have this skill should not be in the conversation. to put what 
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carlyle calls “the swarm” in control would be, in his mind, against the 
best interests of “the swarm” itself:
in our own country, too, swarmery has played a great part for many years past; and 
especially is now playing, in these very days and months. . . . ask yourself about 
“Liberty,” for example; what you do really mean by it, what in any just and rational 
soul is that divine quality of liberty? that a good man be “free,” as we call it, be 
permitted to unfold himself in works of goodness and nobleness, is surely a blessing 
to him, immense and indispensable;—to him and to those about him. But that a bad 
man be “free,”—permitted to unfold himself in his particular way, is contrariwise 
the fatallest curse you could inflict on him; curse and nothing else, to him and all 
his neighbours. him the very heavens call upon you to persuade, to urge, induce, 
compel, into something of well-doing; if you absolutely cannot, if he will continue in 
ill-doing, —then for him (i can assure you, though you will be shocked to hear it), the 
one “blessing” left is the speediest gallows you can lead him to. (“sn,” 8-9)
carlyle’s rhetorical style is verbose, but his point is understood: he 
opposes democratization because, in his mind, it is not in his nation’s 
best interests. Liberty for the “bad man” is neither good for him nor 
for his community. Liberty for “bad men”—let alone for women, a 
proposal that carlyle does not broach—is in no one’s best interests, 
carlyle argues, because if suffrage is extended to “bad men,” these 
“bad men,” given this liberty, will not only continue to “unfold them-
selves” in “bad” ways, but after enfranchisement, they will also do bad 
things with the vote. Who are these “bad men”? What characteristics 
identify them? carlyle does not specify, so we are left to assume, as in 
other areas of his ideal republic, that such judgments are to be left to 
the “aristocracy.” the punishment for being “bad,” however, is not in 
doubt: the “speediest gallows.” carlyle believes he is arguing for his 
country’s best interests—in a manner that is consistent with the long 
history of political paternalism. 
this paternalism is, of course, entirely consistent with racist, clas-
sist, and sexist ideologies. carlyle’s skepticism of the autonomy of com-
mon people is amplified in his continued comments about “the swarm.” 
“By far the notablest result of swarmery, in these times,” carlyle argues, 
is that of the late american [civil] War, with settlement of the nigger Question for 
result. essentially the nigger Question was one of the smallest; and in itself did not 
much concern mankind in the present time of struggles and hurries. one always rather 
likes the nigger; evidently a poor blockhead with good dispositions, with affections, 
attachments, —with a turn for nigger melodies, and the like: —he is the only sav-
age of all the coloured races that doesn’t die out on sight of the White man; but can 
actually live beside him, and work and increase and be merry. the almighty maker 
has appointed him to be a servant. (“sn,” 5) 
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for carlyle, “the swarm” is a term with clear racial implications, but it 
is also a term that includes a broader swath of people who “attempt to 
cut asunder [their] straps and fetters”: 
certain it is, there is nothing but vulgarity in our People’s expectations, resolutions or 
desires, in this epoch. it is all a peaceable mouldering or tumbling down from mere 
rottenness and decay; whether slowly mouldering or rapidly tumbling, there will be 
nothing found of real or true in the rubbish-heap, but a most true desire of making 
money easily, and of eating it pleasantly. (“sn” 22)
While carlyle also has biting comments for “the vulgar millionaire,” 
who he believes to be a “‘bloated’ specimen” (“sn,” 35), carlyle’s rac-
ist epithets and his comments about the “trades Union, in quest of its 
‘4 eights,’ with assassin pistol in its hand” (“sn,” 35-36) are delivered 
with far more hostility. these “4 eights,” a reference to the labor move-
ment’s demand for “eight hours to work, eight hours to play, / eight 
hours to sleep, and eight shillings a day” (“sn,” 35), are indicative of 
the threats that the swarm makes to the “old order.” carlyle assumes a 
gender hierarchy, and explicitly argues for racial and class hierarchies, 
but his vision of a natural and just order is laughable.
carlyle’s counterproposal to stem democratization is to discipline 
the swarm through military drill:
[o]ne often wishes the entire Population could be thoroughly drilled; into coöpera-
tive movement, into individual behaviour, correct, precise, and at once habitual and 
orderly as mathematics, in all or in very many points, —and ultimately in the point of 
actual military service, should such be required of it! (“sn,” 46)
“discipline,” carlyle argues, is what the swarm needs. this training is 
“one of the noblest capabilities of man,” and it preserves “man’s heaven-
born docility” (“sn,” 48). But even further, carlyle argues that such 
methods would be sources of “pleasure” for the swarm. if we could 
only learn to accept the orderly habits of mind and body that precise 
drill teaches, carlyle argues, we could also learn that following orders 
and marching in lockstep is somehow pleasurable. this is the flipside 
of the hierarchical coin: if the problem of politics is finding and train-
ing the right leaders, one also needs methods of training the followers 
to be docile. the backhand side of carlyle’s paternalism is domination 
disguised as doing “good” works. 
to be fair, carlyle is no determinist: he does not believe that 
one’s position at birth damns one to continuous membership in the 
“rubbish-heap.” carlyle makes exceptions for those rare cases he calls 
“heroes”—individuals who can rise above the “swarm” by virtue of 
their exceptional nature:
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[the] industrial hero, here and there recognisable and known to me, as developing 
himself, and as an opulent and dignified kind of man, is already almost an aristocrat by 
class. . . . he cannot do better than unite with this naturally noble kind of aristocrat 
by title; the industrial noble and this one are brothers born; called and impelled to 
coöperate and go together. their united result is what we want from both. and the 
noble of the future,—if there be any such, as i well discern there must,—will have 
grown out of both. (“sn,” 34-35)
carlyle expresses the aristocratic wish for enlightened forms of author-
ity: the problem he believes needs solving is to identify and train the 
people who would most skillfully hold the reins of power, regardless 
of whether these heroes are industrial workers or bluebloods. even a 
representative democracy—which carlyle tellingly calls an “anarchic 
Parliament” (“sn,” 49)—would go too far in its “count of heads” 
(“sn,” 1). 
We can place what Betsy erkkila names “carlyle’s call for an au-
thoritarian state” (254) into an intellectual history, but this history is 
not past. carlyle echoes Plato’s argument from the republic about an 
ideal society where “those who govern must be the best.”23 as c. L. 
r. James argues, those who share carlyle’s thoughts have always been 
hostile to the idea that “every cook can govern.” as James writes, 
we make a colossal mistake if we believe that [these ideas are] past history. for Plato’s 
best known book, the republic, is his description of an ideal society to replace the 
democracy, and it is a perfect example of a totalitarian state, governed by an elite. 
and what is worse, Plato started and brilliantly expounded a practice which has lasted 
to this day among intellectuals—a constant speculation about different and possible 
methods of government, all based on a refusal to accept the fact that the common 
man can actually govern. (par. 51)
the language carlyle uses in his argument is different than the language 
that Plato uses in his, but the goal is hauntingly similar—they favor 
a restriction of democracy because to reinforce a hierarchy is to keep 
the “swarm” subordinated to the “aristocracy.” the justification that 
Plato and carlyle use is consistent: they argue that the effective and 
efficient administration of any community requires the wisdom and 
technical skill of an authority. When political movements challenge that 
authority, the very foundation of the community is called into question. 
therefore, race, gender, or class-based hierarchies, in carlyle’s vision, 
are not problematic; rather, they contribute to the overall stability of 
the community. if democracy is extended too quickly, too widely, this 
logic argues, the previously disenfranchised groups actually harm their 
own interests. if we would only follow the vision of our inspired leaders, 
carlyle believes, peace and prosperity would be sure to follow. 
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the Democratization of “all Public and Private Life”
in Whitman’s mind, “shooting niagara” was a return to the past, 
a regression to an older, inferior form of politics. Whitman set out to 
write about things yet to come, to help to enact democracy’s future (PW, 
2:392-393). he believed that democracy was in its “embryo condition” 
(PW, 2:392), and, therefore, he “presume[d] to write, as it were, upon 
things that exist not, and travel by maps yet unmade, and a blank” (PW, 
2:391). Because “Whitman worked from the premise that his duty as 
the national bard was to put democratic theory, the cultural lifeblood 
of nineteenth-century america, to verse” (mack, 160), carlyle’s essay 
must have seemed like an attack on the principles that Whitman had 
spent most of his life defending. nevertheless, when Whitman writes 
about “shooting niagara” in Democratic Vistas, he displays an immense 
capacity to empathize with the arguments that carlyle makes. 
i was at first roused to much anger and abuse by this essay from mr. carlyle, so insult-
ing to the theory of america—but happening to think afterwards how i had more than 
once been in the like mood, during which his essay was evidently cast, and seen persons 
and things in the same light, (indeed some might say there are signs of the same feeling 
in these vistas)—i have since read it again, not only as a study, expressing as it does 
certain judgments from the highest feudal point of view, but have read it with respect 
as coming from an earnest soul, and as contributing certain sharp-cutting metallic 
grains, which, if not gold or silver, may be good hard, honest iron. (PW, 2:375-376)
Whitman recognizes that carlyle’s arguments are not to be hastily 
dismissed. he wants his readers to know that carlyle writes from “the 
highest feudal point of view,” and that carlyle’s argument could be 
laudable, perhaps, if one saw the value in defending what Whitman 
calls “feudalism.” But Whitman also wants his readers to know that his 
“anger and abuse” abated when he realized that he could sympathize 
with carlyle. 
erkkila writes that Democratic Vistas “originated in an effort to 
‘counterblast’ carlyle’s attack,” but she points out that “Whitman 
quickly realized that he shared carlyle’s diagnosis of the diseases of 
democracy” (247). We may be tempted to think that Whitman is 
conceding to carlyle when Whitman writes that he has “seen persons 
and things in the same light” as carlyle did, but, like erkkila, we need 
to deal in shades of nuance to recognize that Whitman’s empathy for 
carlyle’s argument does not equal agreement with carlyle’s argument. 
Whitman writes that carlyle—“the eminent person just mention’d”— 
“sneeringly asks whether we expect to elevate and improve a nation’s 
politics by absorbing such morbid collections and qualities therein. the 
point is a formidable one, and there will doubtless always be numbers 
of solid and reflective citizens who will never get over it” (PW, 2:379). 
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But to Whitman, carlyle provides the best argument one can make 
in defending “feudalism.” this does not mean that arguments defend-
ing “feudalism” are very persuasive to democrats, however. Whitman 
ultimately points out that, though earnestly written, carlyle’s essay con-
tains “certain sharp-cutting metallic grains, which, if not gold or silver, 
may be good, hard, honest iron” (PW, 2:376). the “if not” is important 
here—“if not gold or silver” implies that these are the metals that are 
most precious. Whitman acknowledges the worth of carlyle’s argu-
ment, but ultimately, he signals that although iron is a valuable metal, 
democratic arguments, not “feudal” arguments, set the gold standard.
Whitman quickly confronts carlyle’s criticism of the autonomy 
of “the unnamed, unknown rank and file.” having analyzed “the full 
conception of these facts and points, and all that they infer, pro and 
con—with yet unshaken faith in the elements of the american masses, 
the composites, of both sexes, and even consider’d as individuals” (PW, 
2:372-373) in the opening paragraphs of Democratic Vistas, Whitman 
defends the autonomy of the common people. While Whitman recog-
nizes that people can be “crude,” he does not think that this crudeness 
is a sufficient basis for their continued disenfranchisement (PW, 2:379). 
Whitman’s comments about idiocracy—which he spells “idiocrasy”—
most clearly separate Whitman’s point of view from carlyle’s. idiocracy, 
which literally means personal-rule or government, is a loose synonym 
for autonomy. many have missed the connection between idiocracy and 
autonomy, a connection which is underscored by the reference Whitman 
makes to “John stuart mill’s profound essay on Liberty in the future” 
(PW, 2:362). Whitman is of course referring to mill’s “on Liberty,” 
an essay in which mill examines the tensions between authority and 
liberty, ultimately arguing for a dramatically expanded conception of 
liberty. Whitman, of course, would agree with mill; carlyle would not. 
one concrete example of Whitman’s belief in autonomy is his na-
scent support for women’s equality. approximately fifty years before 
women won the right to vote, Whitman expressed his support for the 
suffrage movement:
democracy, in silence, biding its time, ponders its own ideals, not of literature and 
art only—not of men only, but of women. the idea of the women of america, (extri-
cated from this daze, this fossil and unhealthy air which hangs about the word lady,) 
develop’d, raised to become the robust equals, workers, and, it may be, even practical 
and political deciders with the men. . . . then there are mutterings, (we will not now 
stop to heed them here, but they must be heeded,) of something more revolutionary. 
the day is coming when the deep questions of woman’s entrance amid the arenas of 
practical life, politics, the suffrage, &c., will not only be argued all around us, but 
may be put to decision, and real experiment. (PW, 2:389, 401)
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Whitman may not be a feminist by twenty-first-century standards, but 
for his time, these comments and others he makes regarding women’s 
suffrage are evidence that, at least along gender lines, he tries to imagine 
a more inclusive idea of democracy. simply put, whereas carlyle argues 
that the “swarm” does not have the capacity for autonomy required by 
democracy, and that this lack justifies the need for a hero class, Whitman 
disagrees, and therefore, he argues for a radical reinterpretation of de-
mocracy. one wishes that Whitman had stopped to heed other political 
topics of the day, like the post-bellum debates about enfranchising the 
newly emancipated Black population, but we do not find these ideas in 
Whitman’s essay.24 for this reason alone, Democratic Vistas may be the 
“secular bible of democracy,” but it is a text about ideas that remain 
unwritten, and a history that has yet to be enacted. 
in response to “shooting niagara,” Whitman proposed a radical 
reinterpretation of democracy that would expand it beyond issues of 
governing and elections. as we know, to be radical is to be concerned 
with the root or the roots, and as such, Whitman’s radicalism has less 
to do with being outside mainstream political opinion (though many 
of his ideas certainly are), and has more to do with critiquing the roots 
of “all public and private life”—the assumptions that sustain such 
institutions. Whitman’s proposal in Democratic Vistas is for the radical 
democratization of civil society—of literature, churches, schools, and 
even the armed forces: 
did you, too, o friend, suppose democracy was only for elections, for politics, and for 
a party name? i say democracy is only of use there that it may pass on and come to its 
flower and fruits in manners, in the highest forms of interaction between men, and 
their beliefs—in religion, literature, colleges, and schools—democracy in all public 
and private life, and in the army and navy. (PW, 2:389) 
the radicalism of Whitman’s proposal is palpable: he wants to de-
mocratize even the armed forces, the institutions that one might think 
would be most hostile to democratic organization. But we would not 
know the extent of this project by reading the Pragmatic Whitman. 
mack abridges the quote after “their beliefs,” deleting the institutions 
that Whitman proposes be brought under democratic control (152). 
the abridged part of the text is vital to advancing the scholarship on 
Democratic Vistas. Whitman’s radical idea is to democratize “all public 
and private life,” an idea that is far-reaching in its implications, and 
has not been satisfactorily explored. 
to abridge the quote is problematic because Whitman underscores 
the proposal to democratize even institutions like “the army and the 
navy.” a proposal for the democratization of the armed services is an 
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ideal well beyond the vision of the pragmatic tradition, but Whitman 
chooses this example purposefully, and confronts it directly:
the whole present system of the officering and personnel of the army and navy of 
these states, and the spirit and letter of their trebly-aristocratic rules and regulations, 
is a monstrous exotic, a nuisance and revolt, and belong here just as much as orders 
of nobility, or the Pope’s council of cardinals. i say if the present theory of our army 
and navy is sensible and true, then the rest of america is an unmitigated fraud. (PW 
2:389-390)
Why would Whitman place such an emphasis on democratizing the 
military? one possible answer is that it is difficult to find a set of or-
ganizations that are more rigidly hierarchical, and Whitman wants to 
present this specific challenge. We also remember that the military is 
carlyle’s model for the broader society, one where his heroes hold a 
high rank and where the people march in precise formation. it is no ac-
cident, then, that Whitman places such an emphasis on democratizing 
the armed services: to use his language, they are feudal organizations 
founded on the idea that authority ought to flow from the top of the 
hierarchy down. Whitman also looks at schools, churches, and literature 
and observes that they are all operating on similarly feudal foundations. 
the problem Whitman sees is that these foundations are antago-
nistic to democratic ideals. “the spirit and letter” of the rules that 
govern the military, like other institutions in american civil society, are 
“aristocratic,” and are therefore “exotic”: they are not autochthonic, 
not rooted in america’s grass, but rather are borrowed from a country 
with “feudal” foundations. Whitman’s proposal to democratize “all 
public and private life” would seem to carlyle to be unwise, impracti-
cal, or impossible, but, again, this is because, in Whitman’s opinion, 
carlyle writes from “the highest feudal point of view” (PW, 2:375). 
carlyle operates with a different frame of reference, one that has been 
shaped by a civil society and a government that had been built upon 
a non-democratic foundation. Whitman feels that a democratic frame 
of reference and a democratic ideology are needed to reinterpret all 
aspects of american civil society, and that this democratization is a test 
to america itself: either democracy would take root in “all public and 
private life” or america would be “an unmitigated fraud” (PW, 2:390). 
it is precisely this philosophical approach, this willingness to think 
beyond what now seems possible, that is most appealing, and, impor-
tantly, beyond the vision of the pragmatist tradition. While we might 
wish that Whitman’s project were savvier and more fully developed 
along racial, gender, and class lines, in Democratic Vistas Whitman does 
speculate about the specific steps needed for this approach. the first 
step, Whitman writes, was to lay democratic foundations in guiding 
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texts; the second step was to insure for material stability and to build 
infrastructure; and the third step, which had yet to be taken, was to 
democratize “all public and private life”: 
the third stage, rising out of the previous ones, to make them and all illustrious, i, 
now, for one, promulge, announcing a native expression-spirit, getting into form, adult, 
and through mentality, for these states, self-contain’d, different from others, more 
expansive, more rich and free, to be evidenced by original authors and poets to come, 
by american personalities, plenty of them, male and female, traversing the states, none 
excepted—and by native superber tableaux and growths of language, songs, operas, 
orations, lectures, architecture—and by a sublime and serious religious democracy 
sternly taking command, dissolving the old, sloughing off surfaces, and from its own interior 
and vital principles, reconstructing, democratizing society. (PW 2:410, emphasis mine)
several of the assumptions here are overly simplistic—about “gen-
eral suffrage,” equitable infrastructure, and “general employment,” all 
having been accomplished already, all of which are rendered with the 
universal male pronoun, all imagined within the context of the nation 
state and its subdivisions—and they display Whitman’s prejudices and 
limitations. But because even the “unnamed, unknown rank and file” 
(PW, 2:377) possess the capacity for autonomy, Whitman sees no reason 
why “all public and private life” should not be brought under democratic 
control. in a certain sense, Whitman is proposing a type of deconstruc-
tion with this project: he is not just critiquing “public and private life” 
as they are, but he is also critiquing their ideological foundations: those 
“interior and vital principles” are the theoretical scaffolding for democ-
racy; if those foundations were antithetical to democracy then, like the 
army and the navy, american democracy would be an “unmitigated 
fraud.” Whitman looks at american civil society and finds that much 
of it is founded upon a “feudal” ideology, not a democratic ideology: 
We see the sons and daughters of the new World, ignorant of its genius, not yet 
inaugurating the native, the universal, and the near, still importing the distant, the 
partial, and the dead. We see London, Paris, italy—not original, superb, as where 
they belong—but second-hand here, where they do not belong. We see the shreds of 
hebrews, romans, Greeks; but where, on her own soil, do we see, in any faithful, 
highest, proud expression, america herself? i sometimes question whether she has a 
corner in her own house. (PW, 2:411)
a democratic community, in Whitman’s mind, cannot remain divided 
for long between a democratic ideal and a reality of a civil society op-
erating with non-democratic foundations. While it may be interpreted 
as such, we need not believe that Whitman’s idea is limited to a feel-
good suggestion that a democratic ethos is sufficient—in other words, 
that just because citizens vote for representatives every two, four, or 
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six years, that it somehow means that other spheres of public life are 
democratic as well. Quite the contrary, to democratize our institutions 
would mean an organizational upheaval and a redistribution of power. 
as Jacques derrida notes, to follow the term’s etymology, “democracy 
would be precisely this, a force (kratos), a force in the form of a sover-
eign authority (sovereign, that is kurios or kuros, having the power to 
decide, to be decisive, to prevail, to have reason over or win out over 
[avoir raison de] and to give the force of law, kuroo), and thus the power 
and ipseity of the people (demos).”25 a grassroots political movement to 
democratize the workplace or the military would inspire the same fear 
in the corporate ceos and the generals that the nineteenth-century 
political movements put in the hearts of carlyle’s heroes.
Whitman was well aware of the difficulty of this task, and likewise 
aware of the shockwaves such a proposal would send: 
for america, type of progress, and of essential faith in man, above all his errors and 
wickedness—few suspect how deep, how deep it really strikes. the world evidently 
supposes, and we have evidently supposed so too, that the states are merely to achieve 
the equal franchise, an elective government—to inaugurate the respectability of labor, 
and become a nation of practical operatives, law-abiding, orderly and well off. yes, 
those are indeed parts of the task of america; but they not only do not exhaust the 
progressive conception, but rather arise, teeming with it, as the mediums of deeper, 
higher progress. daughter of a physical revolution—mother of the true revolutions, 
which are of the interior life, and of the arts. (PW, 2:410)
suffrage alone does not “exhaust the progressive conception,” in Whit-
man’s words. this, too, for the seeds of a radical project: voting is not 
the conclusion of democracy, but is, rather, one of its tools. as Whit-
man did not, we should not assume that voting rights are the end goals 
of democracy. for Whitman, democracy was a more expansive ideal, 
including both “physical” and “true” revolutions. it has no teleological 
end state, but is, rather, something that is always a negotiation between 
its past, present, and possible futures. 
the radical Whitman
at the end of Democratic Vistas, Whitman suggests reading his 
text as a living document, rather than a vision to be imposed upon his 
readers. he writes, 
Books are to be call’d for, and supplied, on the assumption that the process of reading 
is not a half-sleep, but, in highest sense, an exercise, a gymnast’s struggle; that the 
reader is to do something for himself, must be on the alert, must himself or herself 
construct indeed the poem, argument, history, metaphysical essay—the text furnish-
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ing the hints, the clue, the start of the framework. not the book needs so much to be 
the complete thing, but the reader of the book does. (PW, 2:424-425) 
much of Whitman’s vision should remain in the nineteenth century—for 
example, the limits of his race, gender, and class analysis, his explicit 
support for manifest destiny, his phrases that have a dark nationalistic 
overtone, and his tendency to suggest that his ideas have divine origins—
but his proposal to democratize “all public and private life” is an idea 
that merits further investigation. how might we interpret “all public and 
private life,” exactly? Whitman does not specify what he means by “all 
public and private life,” other than mentioning religion, literature, col-
leges, schools, the army, and the navy, nor does he provide much detail 
about how we might begin this project. But even if he did, we would 
not want to import Whitman’s vision, unaltered, into the twenty-first 
century. We can, however, use the text to formulate the questions that 
might help us to imagine new democratic vistas. how might we break 
our own straps and fetters? how might a democratic military operate? 
What would a democratic workplace look like?26 
rather than articulating visions for others to follow, the better 
approach is to think of ways that literary study can help to build the 
grassroots political movements, the widespread organizations, coali-
tions, and collectivities that have proven themselves historically to have 
the credibility and force to articulate and implement political change. 
in the best moments of Democratic Vistas, Whitman refutes the idea that 
political progress requires putting into place new forms of authority, but 
rather requires efforts to enhance freedom and autonomy, ideals that 
are always tempered by the equally important need to live peacefully 
with others. this idea is one of many reasons why Democratic Vistas 
continues to have relevance for us. 
ironically enough, carlyle offers us ideas to consider as well. car-
lyle’s criticisms are antecedents to the counterarguments for a project 
of radical democracy, and he also makes a suggestion about the orga-
nization of our political movements. davis writes that 
swarmery threatens to wrest political control from Britain’s “real-superiors”—the 
aristocratic heroes who rise in carlyle’s imagination to stand in the breach against 
lawlessness and mass-rule—the same barbarians at the gates of [matthew arnold’s] 
culture and anarchy. true emancipation, carlyle believed, comes from finding and 
fulfilling one’s place in a social hierarchy and paying honorable allegiance to the cultural 
elite best suited by birth, training, precedent, and disposition to fulfill humankind’s 
‘instinctive desire of Guidance.’ Without that guidance, human society devolves into 
brutal and beastlike forms of existence, no better than cattle, beavers, and bees. (541)
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for carlyle, the “swarm” implies that political activists are acting as 
sub-humans, as animals, and he opposes this imagery to that of his 
hero. the metaphor of a swarm is an apt one, but while carlyle gives 
the term a negative inflection, we need not use it in the same way. car-
lyle’s distain for and fear of the swarm is telling: in one sense, it is the 
same reaction that an aristocracy has to any democratic movement. in 
another sense, however, carlyle’s metaphor provides an indication of the 
characteristics that are needed in contemporary political movements. 
the person who looks at insect swarms or large political movements 
in superficial ways tends to see disorder and chaos—much like carlyle 
did—but it is more correct to say that these collectivities are highly 
organized—just not in a hierarchical way. it turns out that horizontal 
structures, without strict command and control mechanisms, exhibit 
very complex organizational behavior.27
We are only beginning to understand human organization in 
terms of complex systems, rather than as simple hierarchies, but the 
weaknesses of hierarchical organization are apparent: when political 
movements look more like pyramids than like swarms, they become 
susceptible to bureaucratization, to an emphasis on their leadership, 
and are more likely to be dominated by doctrinaire party lines than 
by the intellectual input of all their participants. the swarm, on the 
other hand, represents a multiple identity, a hydra-like organization 
that is strong, uncontrollable, and organized horizontally, rather than 
hierarchically. it is these swarms, the political movements—not the 
pragmatic vanguards—that transform our politics and our political 
ideas.28 in every political struggle, whether for the electoral franchise, 
for civil or human rights, for fair working conditions, and in “physical” 
and “true” revolutions, history shows that political movements—which 
of course include intellectual workers—have been the forces that have 
proven able to achieve material, cultural, and political progress. our 
task ought not to be to follow the vision of a more enlightened class of 
leaders, but rather to build political movements capable of achieving 
the goals we seek. 
to do this, we can stand upon Whitman’s shoulders, looking fur-
ther into those democratic vistas, but ultimately, even the view from the 
vantage point of those large shoulders will be too limited, so we must 
seek further vistas. the tension brought to the surface in the debate 
between carlyle and Whitman, however—a tension between those who 
would restrict an already restricted definition of democracy and those 
who would reinterpret and expand democracy in more radical ways—is 
very much a part of our politics, as is the tension between the demands 
of authority and the hopes for ever-expanding ideas and practices of 
liberty and autonomy. this is a point Whitman recognizes—he writes 
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that “while many were supposing things established and completed, 
really the grandest things always remain” (PW, 2:425). 
the parameters of the debate between carlyle and Whitman are 
instructive, and we can continue by revising the questions that Whitman 
raised and the vistas he imagined. if the democratization of the work-
place, the military, or of our schools were put to a real test, the carlyles 
of our historical moment will certainly howl much like the nineteenth-
century version did, and this will be one indication that we have begun 
cutting our own straps and fetters. once framed in this manner, the 
ambiguities, nuances, and contingencies of the argument multiply, and 
complex decisions follow. the “great question[s] of democracy” (PW, 
2:363) have to be addressed from many perspectives, and in specific 
local and historical contexts, and by credible and powerful political 
movements. these will be grand and difficult questions, and as such, 
they can motivate our further research.
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